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Ethics 2000 and Insurance
Defense Conflicts of Interest in Kentucky
BY CRAIG PAULUS*
INTRODUCTION
W Tith the approach of the year 2000, the American Bar
Association has undertaken a project to review and revise
• • the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.1 The
ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission is currently re-examining old rules and
considering new ones. This Comment examines how these revisions may
or may not affect the ethics of insurance defense in Kentucky.
Conflicting loyalties and interests can put an insurance defense
attorney in a position of choosing between the interests of the insured, her
true client, and the insurance company, her true employer. Confidentiality
and candor can become muddled in questions of insurance defense. The
seemingly simple tripartite relationship of lawyer, insured, and insurer can
rapidly devolve into a complex web of conflicts. Kentucky's Rules of
Professional Responsibility, based on the current ABA Model Rules, have
their own way of solving the insurance defense dilemma. If the Ethics 2000
proposals were adopted, however, Kentucky's current system would be
affected.
This Comment presents an analysis of the current law of Kentucky and
how the Ethics 2000 proposals would change the current system. To
conclude, a brief outline of the safeguards in Kentucky's professional rules
with particular emphasis on how the insurance defense attorney can use
these to her advantage will be offered.
I. KENTUCKY LAW AND THE ETHICS 2000 PROPOSALS
Kentucky law is straightforward in its treatment of the ethics of
insurance defense. The one fundamental principle that guides conduct in
J.D. 1999, University of Kentucky.
See Ethics 2000 Commission Hears Plenty of Suggestions for Reforming
Rules, [14 Current Reports] Laws. Man. of Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 262, 262
(June 10, 1998).
1349
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
this area is the rule that the insured is the client. 2 This is the most appropri-
ate theoretical system under the Model Rules and has two fundamental
advantages over allowing the insurer to be considered the client. First, it
gives the insured more effective representation by allowing him to be
candid with his attorney. Second, it allows the lawyer to conduct the
representation without the ever-present danger of a mandatory withdrawal.
The immediate corollary of this rule, which is perhaps even more important
than the rule itself, is that the insurer is not the client. It is well known that
the "defense counsel's duty to the insured arises from the attorney-client
relationship and is governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct."3 The
insurance company is merely a third party payor as described in Rule
1.8(f).4
Although this principle must never be ignored, the insurer is not
without a voice in the relationship. Rule 1.2 divides the decision-making
authority of the client and the attorney, generally placing the objectives of
representation in the hands of the client and the means of representation in
the discretion of the lawyer.5 While there is apparently no place for a third
party to make decisions under this scheme, the Proposed Final Draft of the
Restatement (Third) ofthe Law Governing Lawyers suggests that the third
party payor may have some part to play in decision-making.6 The Ethics
2000 Commission has looked to the Restatement for guidance as to
revisions in this area and others. Regardless of the outcome of the
Restatement, even where confidentiality is protected, the quality of
representation cannot be sacrificed.7
Kentucky's Rule 1.8(f)(1) states that a lawyer shall not accept
compensation from a third party unless such compensation is "in accor-
dance with an agreement between the client and the third party,"8 such as
an insurance contract. The comment to Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules
2 See Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-378 (1995).
3Id.
4 See KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130-1.8(f). This does not mean, however, that the law-
yer owes no duty to the insurer. The Rules impose duties on the lawyer when
dealing with any third party. Where a lawyer works closely with an insurance
company but must maintain the confidentiality of the insured, the most important
rule to remember is honesty. See id. 3.130-4.1.
' See id. 3.130-1.2.
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
7 See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130-1.1.
8Id. 3.130-1.8(f)(1).
9See id. The client may consent to third party payment as well. Additionally,
there are other requirements, including no interference with the lawyer's
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of Professional Conduct (as well as Kentucky's Rule 1.7) specifically
discusses a conflict of interest between a third party payor and the client.10
Using insurance defense as an example, this comment states that the
insurance company is required to provide special counsel for the insured
if there is a conflict of interest." This is the law of many jurisdictions and
can leadto conflicting loyalties."2 However, inKentucky, this shouldnever
be a problem. Kentucky does not permit insurance companies to appoint in-
house counsel or staff attorneys to represent insured customers. 3 This is
due to the inherent conflicts of interest as well as the rules against
corporate practice of law and unauthorized practice of law."4 Where the
insurer is also a client or acts as the attorney, the insured risks losing the
benefits of insurance by being candid with his attorney. In such a case, the
"captive" attorney cannot avoid a conflict. Instead, the attorney can merely
detect a conflict and withdraw from the case. Obviously, if an attorney is
allowed to represent both the insurance company and the insured as clients,
professional independence, no interference with the attorney-client relationship,
and protection of confidential and privileged information. The no interference
requirements seem at odds with the third party decision-making authority suggested
by the Restatement. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
1o See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1998).
"See id.
12The Rule seems to contemplate staff attorneys who are actual employees of
the insurer. Some states permit this arrangement. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics andProfessionalResponsibility, Formal Op. 96-196 (1997), available
in 1997 WL 188817. A close analogy occurs in those states that allow a lawyer or
firm to contract with an insurance company to do all of the insurer's defense work.
SeeFla. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 98-2 (1998), available
in 1998 WL 796691; Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances andDiscipline, Op. 97-7
(1997), available in 1997 WL 782951. These arrangements are not without
difficulties and safeguards, however. The lawyer must remain professionally
independent and face a number of difficulties. For a discussion of the dilemmas of
the in-house counsel of insurance companies, see generally Robert J. Johnson, In-
house Counsel Employed by Insurance Companies: A Difflcult Dilemma
Confronting the Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 945
(1996).
'" SeeKy. BarAss'n, Formal Op. E-331 (1988); see also Ky. BarAss'n, Formal
Op. E-368 (1994) (explaining that although many states permit an attorney to
contract to do all of the insurer's defense work, Kentucky does not); supra note 4.
Though this arrangement is not specifically outlawed by the rules, this prohibition
is justified by the conflicts of interest and the unauthorized practice of law issues
that arise.
4 See Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-33 1.
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conflict situations can ambush the attorney without warning. The waylaid
attorney must then withdraw under Rule 1.16, causing undue delay,
inconvenience, and expense.'5
Suppose, for example, that an insurance company sends its staff
attorney to represent the victim of an auto accident. In the initial interview,
the staff attorney receives information from the insured that would provide
a coverage defense for the insurer. The attorney is suddenly in a conflict
situation. Further, the insured is at a disadvantage under this arrangement
because the attorney's withdrawal signals the existence of a defense to the
insurance company. Failure to withdraw when in a conflict can lead to
liability, and in some circumstances, a waiver is ineffective. In Conrad
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rood,6 a lawyer representedboth the buyer and the seller
in the sale of an automobile franchise. 7 The seller's action for fraud and
negligence was dismissed on the basis of an alleged release of the attorney
signed by all parties at the closing. The release "purported to waive any
conflicts of interest which might exist between [seller] Conrad and [buyer]
Blackhorse so that [the attorney] could represent both."'" The Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the attorney, holding that
"this 'waiver' signed by Conrad cannot, as a matter of law, preclude a trial
upon the issues."' 9 The Court also stated that when an attorney possesses
secret information of one client vital to the other, adequate consultation and
disclosure is not possible. Consequently, a waiver is defective. 0 The fact
that a waiver is not a cure-all to a conflict is a stark reminder of the
seriousness of the conflict rules.
The Ethics 2000 Commission has discussed a possible revision of Rule
1.8(f). This rule currently reads:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
15 See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130-1.16 ("[A] lawyer... shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if: (1) The representation will result in a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct....").
6 Conrad Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rood, 862 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1993).
17 See id. at 313.
Is Id.
19 Id.
20See id. at 314.
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(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by Rule 1.6.21
As noted above, the commission has considered incorporating the notion
that the insurer should have more power to direct litigation as drawn from
section 215 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
Section 215 states: "A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a client
may be directed by someone other than the client when: (a) the direction
is reasonable in scope and character, such as by reflecting obligations borne
by the person directing the lawyer; and (b) the client consents to the
direction .... ." The commentary to this section provides the example of
an insurance contract that gives the insurer the authority to decide issues
concerning litigation expenses.z3 Where a tactical decision, such as taking
additional costly depositions, will not cause the lawyer to fall below the
required standard of care and is merely a financial decision, the lawyer may
comply with the demands of the insurer.24 Since the insurer is bearing the
costs and possibly the ultimate liability in the litigation, the insurer has
standing to assert a claim for professional negligence in the conduct of that
litigation. The comment and illustration to this Restatement section thus
address the conflict of interest problem in this situation though the black
letter law of section 215 does not. Where there is a conflict of interest, the
attorney must act in the client's interest even under section 215. This
generally means thatprotecting confidential communications is of foremost
importance and that choosing whether to spend more time and money
conducting discovery is a tangential matter.
Kentucky may not agree with the Restatement. Formal Ethics Opinion
E-331 makes it clear that budget restrictions imposed by the insurance
carrier are touchy matters and can lead to ethical conflicts. 6 In fact, when
the carrier's demands begin to affect the attorney's independent judgment,
withdrawal may be justified or even required.27 It must be remembered that
though the insurance contract is a" 'hard-boiled commercial' "relationship,
2 1 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1998).
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215(2) (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
See id. § 215(2) cmt. f, illus. 4.
2 See id.
S ee id.
26 See Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-331 (1988).
21 See id.
1998-99] 1353
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the attorney-client relationship is not.28 The ethics of the situation are fact-
sensitive. For instance, perhaps the insurance carrier should receive more
deference when the claim is within the policy limits and the insured has
little personal risk.29
There is the possibility of creating a specific rule within the Model
Rules to clarify the duties of an insurance defense lawyer when conflicts
occur between insurer and insured.30 The latter proposal is suggested in the
writings of Richard Zitrin. Zitrin states:
The rule should make clear that conflicts that occur during the course
of the representation of an insured under a policy of insurance must result
in the lawyer in question protecting the rights of the insured, even at the
expense of the insurer, and must include maintaining confidences of the
insured even where revelation of those confidences would ordinarily be
provided the insurer in a non-conflict situation.
31
This proposal comports with the approach already taken in Kentucky ethics
opinions.32 Despite the fact that such a rule has not been released, the
proposal may provide useful guidance and clarification. In short, the
concept of a specific insurance defense rule is not without merit.
Another substantive proposal would expand the text of Rule 1.7 and
clarify when it is permissible to seek a client's consent to a conflict of
interest.33 This expansion may be of more import to Kentucky's rules
governing insurance defense as well as dual representation cases than a
new rule.34 Although the lawyer does not "represent" the insurer, an
2 Id. (quoting Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D.
Wis. 1977)).29 If the proper course of action is not clear and the situation cannot be resolved
amicably, seeking an advisory opinion is a good idea. See infra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text. Of course, the jury may surprise the insured with a judgment
greater than expected.
30 See Center for Professional Responsibility, Written Testimony of Richard
Zitrin (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/zitrin.html>.
31 Id.
32 See Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-378 (1995).
11 See Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000-Proposed Work
Plan-Issues to be Considered (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org
cpr/wkpliss.html>.
34 See Conrad Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rood, 862 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1993). This case
sets one boundary in this area: an attorney cannot represent two parties when
[VOL. 871354
ongoing relationship can create a conflict. In particular, an attorney who
receives a substantial amount of work from a particular insurer may find
that her financial self-interest clouds, or appears to cloud, her judgment. 5
Guidance as to when it is inappropriate to ask for a client's consent would
be helpful in a number of situations.
Other potential modifications to Rule 1.7 include clarifications of the
exceptions to the rule. These would be largely a matter of form over
substance. Currently, the rule reads, "A lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation of the client may be materially limited... unless the
lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected."'36 One suggested revision would change this proviso language to
read, "[unless] the lawyer reasonably believes the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client."'37
The debate over this rule has included the suggestion that the two
exceptions, this one for "competent and diligent representation 3 and the
client-consent exception, should be collapsed as in section 201 of the
Restatement (Third) ofthe Law GoverningLawyers3 9 Again, this proposed
change would not be of great substantive significance.
possession of one client's confidential information is vital to the other client. The
case also indirectly permits professional negligence liability to be premised on the
failure of an attorney to withdraw. See id. at 313-14; supra notes 15-20 and
accompanying text.
31 See Fla. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 98-2 (1998),
available in 1998 WL 796691; Ohio Bd. ofComm'rs on Grievance and Discipline,
Op. 97-7 (1997), available in 1997 WL 782951. These opinions discuss the
propriety of flat rate compensation for the insurance defense attorney, concluding
that professional independence is the touchstone of ethical responsibility.
36 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1998).
17 Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 MeetingMinutes (visited
May 18, 1999) <http://www.ababnet.org/cpr/e2k/092798mtg.html>.
38 Id.
31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). The "competent and diligent representation"
revision was suggested and passed unanimously by the Commission in September
1998. Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Meeting Minutes, supra
note 37. However, an approach similar to that used in section 201 of the
Restatement was then discussed and rejected at the December 1998 meeting. See
Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association Center for
ProfessionalResponsibility Commission on Evaluation ofthe Rules ofProfessional
Conduct (Ethics 2000)-Minutes (visited May 18, 1999) <http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/e2k/121198mtg.html>.
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If. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES
In application, the principle that the insured is the client means
protecting the confidential information of that client from the person who
is paying the bill. Loyalty and confidentiality demand that the lawyer who
is privy to information that may give a defense to the insurer keep such
information confidential. ° Nevertheless, there are common scenarios-some
seemingly innocent-that must be guarded against by the vigilant lawyer.
Consider for example, the seemingly innocent request by the insurer to
have a representative present at a deposition. In fact, it is generally
improper for a Kentucky attorney to allow an insurance company to have
a representative present at the deposition of the insured 4 Even when the
insurance company demands to have a representative present, the attorney
must resist if it puts the insured at risk. 2 Further, even though waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and work product protection should generally be
considered and avoided, when the insurance carrier and the insured are
cooperating in a"common interest arrangement," the privileges are waived
between the cooperating parties.43
Insurance defense conflicts come in all shapes and sizes. Consider
these simple examples: (1) a lawsuit is brought claiming two causes of
action, one covered by the insurance policy and the other not;' (2) the
amount of the claim exceeds the policy limitations or a considerable
deductible gives the insured and the carrier different incentives to settle;45
(3) there are possible coverage defenses, all of which would negate the
insurance company's duty to pay; (4) a claim is brought against the
4 See Ky. SUP. CT. R. 3.130-1.6.
" See Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-340 (1990). This is not aper se rule. There
are instances in which the insurer should have a representative present. However,
this opinion strongly hints that giving in to the insurer's demands when it is
prejudicial to the client can lead to malpractice liability. See id.
42See id.
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 (Proposed
Final DraftNo. 1, 1996).
" See Or. Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 1991-121 (1991). When the
covered claim is subject to a motion to dismiss and the other is not, the insured has
a strong incentive not to have the former dismissed. If it were dismissed, he would
lose the benefit of a carrier-paid defense. According to this opinion, the attorney
cannot ethically move to dismiss the claim against the wishes of the insured.
Ironically, Oregon considers both the insured and the insurer clients. See id.
4 See Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-331 (1988).
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insurance company itself;46 (5) the insured is or maybe committing fraud.47
In these situations, the professionally responsible course of action may not
always be clear, but there are some techniques that can protect the attorney
from discipline and liability.
The first is the advisory opinion. Under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
3.530, an attorney in doubt as to the ethical propriety of a course of action
may request advice from the Ethics Committee.48 In emergencies, the
request can be made over the telephone.49 A prompt telephonic answer is
given, followed by an informal letter. This system has several advantages.
First, it provides practical, helpful guidance. Further, all information given
to the Ethics Committee member furnishing the opinion is kept confiden-
tial.50 There is, however, the possibility that the ethical guidance will be
wrong, and the lawyer will violate the Rules of Professional Conduct by
following it. In such a case, following the guidance of the advisory opinion
protects the attorney from professional discipline regardless of the
soundness of the advice. Unfortunately, it does not protect against liability
arising from professional negligence or a breach of fiduciary duty.
Nonetheless, the advisory opinion is an excellent tool for avoiding ethical
violations.
Ethical problems may also be avoided by limiting the scope of
representation and limiting liability prospectively. The latter method is
straightforward but disfavored by the Kentucky Rules of Professional
46 See Ky Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. E-378 (1995). This scenario is one where the
insured is sued and, in turn, the carrier has a claim filed against it under the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act ("UCSPA"). The insurer must not insist on the
dismissal of the UCSPA claims as a condition of settlement. The Kentucky Bar
Association believes that "defense counsel should be free to abide by the insured's
decisions concerning the objectives of the litigation and settlement." Id.
47 See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130-1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, orassist a client, in conductthatthe lawyerknows is criminal or fraudulent
.... "). However, the lawyer is prevented from disclosing the fraud to the insurance
carrier by Rule 1.6. See id. 3.130-1.2(d) cmt. In a now familiar turn of events, the
attorney may be obliged to withdraw under Rule 1.16. See id. 3.130-1.16. Crime
and fraud also give rise to exceptions to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege.
See KY. R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
48 See KY. SuP. CT. R. 3.530.
49 See id. 3.530(l)(b).
50 See id. 3.530(7). However, no attorney-client relationship is formed, and the
committee member furnishing the opinion is insulated from liability for advice
given in good faith.
"' See id. 3.530(3).
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Conduct.5 2 There are two key limitations on the lawyer's ability to disclaim
liability. The client must be independently represented, and the agreement
must be otherwise permittedby law.53 Such an arrangement can easily look
like overreaching by the attorney, and a conflict of interest is inherent in
such an agreement.
As for limiting the scope of representation, Rule 1.2(c) states that "[a]
lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents
after consultation." 54 For example, when representing an insured and the
carrier in wholly unrelated matters, a potential for a conflict of interest
exists. Prudence would dictate that the carrier and the attorney come to an
understanding about the scope of their relationship. Though the rule does
not demand a writing, a memorandum of the agreement or understanding
is a good idea. Some sources suggest that if a client insists that the lawyer
limit the scope of the representation of another client, the lawyer need not
comply.5 It seems wholly appropriate that a third party cannot dictate the
terms of another client's relationship with his attorney. The aggrieved
client may simply find another attorney. However, the temptation to
misrepresent the scope of an attorney-client relationship must be resisted.
Deception of this kind is certain to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct.56 Further, the scope of the representation cannot be limited such
that it would violate the Rules themselves. In other words, the lawyer
cannot limit the representation to the point that counsel would be inade-
quate or improper.
CONCLUSION
The protection of clients and the guidance of lawyers should be the
goal of any set of ethics rules. Though the ethical framework for the
insurance defense counsel in Kentucky is quite comprehensive, the Ethics
2000 proposals may have something to add, especially in addressing client
consent to a conflict. 8 Kentucky should examine the results of the Ethics
52 See id. 3.130-1.8(h).
' See id.
4Id. 3.130-1.2(c).
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 cmt.
g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
56 See KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130-1.1, 1.4; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 cmt g.
57 See KY. SUP. Cr. R. 3.130-1.1 to 1.4.
'8 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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2000 Project when the proposals are finalized and consider updating the
state's rules to further clarify the proper roles and protect the insured. In the
meantime, the prudent Kentucky lawyer should follow the guiding
principal of insurance defense: the insured is the client.

